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Abstract
The global debate on food security and the kinds of farming systems that could prove econom-
ically and ecologically sustainable has focused overwhelmingly on small family farms versus large
commercial farms, with little attention being given to alternative models based on farmer coop-
eration. France offers a significant but under-researched and internationally little-recognized
model of group farming – the GAEC (Groupement Agricole d’Exploitation en Commun) – based
on farmers pooling land, labour and capital. This model is of considerable contemporary interest
for both France and other countries. Catalysed by a 1962 law, GAECs accounted for 7.6% of
farms and 15% of agricultural adult work units in 2010, but their incidence varied greatly across
regions. Using data from the French agricultural census and other sources, this paper identifies
the factors – economic, ecological, social and demographic – underlying this regionally uneven
development of GAECs (and comparatively of EARLs – Exploitations Agricoles a` Responsabilite´
Limite´e – another type of group farm introduced in 1985). Regions with a higher incidence of
group farms are found to be those that were historically dominated by middle-sized farms, had a
local ecology favouring labour-intensive animal breeding, especially pastures, a higher proportion
of agricultural graduates, greater economic equality and social institutions that promote com-
munity cohesion, among other factors. These results illuminate not only the conditions favour-
able to the emergence of group farming in France, but also the conditions under which such
farmer cooperation could take root in other (including developing) countries, subject to context-
specific modifications of the French model.
Corresponding author:
Bruno Dorin, CIRAD Languedoc-Roussillon, 73 rue J.F. Breton, Montpellier, 34398, France.
Email: bruno.dorin@cirad.fr
Environment and Planning A:
Economy and Space
0(0) 1–24
! The Author(s) 2018
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/0308518X18802311
journals.sagepub.com/home/epn
Keywords
Group farming, cooperation, France, GAEC, institutional innovation, regional variations
Introduction
In recent years, an increasing weight is being placed internationally on small family farms as
vehicles for enhancing food security, equity and ecological sustainability (FAO, 2014;
HLPE, 2013). This emphasis brings together two dominant features of farms today: most
are family run – globally at least 88% of all farms are assessed to be family farms (FAO,
2014); and most are small in size – an estimated 84% of farms across 111 countries operate
under 2 hectares (FAO, 2014; see also HLPE, 2013).1 Critics who see such farms as non-
viable present large commercial farms as the alternative (Collier and Dercon, 2014). Both
models, however, leave serious concerns unaddressed. On the one hand, small family farms
face significant constraints linked with scale, fragmentation and resource access, which are
difficult to overcome. On the other hand, large commercial farms have low prospects of
providing jobs either to the vast numbers of people still dependent on agriculture, or to new
entrants to the rural labour force (Dorin, 2017; Dorin et al., 2013; Imai et al., 2017). Clearly,
we need to think about other models of farming. In this context, group farming, wherein
farmers pool their land, labour and capital and share costs and profits, could be of partic-
ular interest. This model, which has received rather little attention either in policy or
research, is based on voluntary cooperation, without farmers forfeiting their private prop-
erty rights, in sharp contrast to the collective farms created through forced collectivization
under socialist regimes.
The lack of attention to voluntary group farming is surprising, given that there are con-
temporary examples in many countries. In France, for instance, group farming has existed at
least since the 1960s, and today there are over 100,000 group farms. Elsewhere, joint farm
enterprises began to emerge in the 1980s and 1990s, such as for cattle upkeep and milk
production in Norway (Almas, 2010) and Ireland (Macken-Walsh and Roche, 2012), and
crop production, especially rice, in Japan (Sarkar and Itoh, 2001). It also emerged in many
post-socialist countries after de-collectivization of agriculture in the 1990s, including in East
Germany, Kyrgyzstan, Romania and Nicaragua.2 Since the early 2000s, it has been promoted
successfully by state governments and civil society in several parts of India (Agarwal, 2010a;
2018). Reasons for the neglect of this alternative model are likely to lie in the adverse expe-
rience of collectivization under socialist regimes;3 the poorly designed and hence largely unsuc-
cessful efforts to promote cooperative farming in the 1950s and 1960s in the post-colonial,
newly independent developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America;4 and, most of all,
in the pessimism embedded in economic theory on the possibility of people cooperating, given
tendencies to free-ride (see Olsen, 1965, among others).
In recent decades, however, a substantial body of empirical work has demonstrated that
communities are successfully cooperating for governing common-pool resources, leading to
improved conservation outcomes (Agarwal, 2010b; Ostrom, 1990). Service cooperatives,
especially for marketing, sharing machines, or procuring inputs, are also widespread glob-
ally.5 But cooperation for governing common-pool resources differs from cooperation for
agricultural production, which involves complex forms of daily interaction. Similarly, mar-
keting cooperatives do not require everyday cooperation in the production process itself.
For instance, family farms can produce milk, meat or crops individually, while using coop-
eratives only for selling these items. In contrast, pooling land, labour and capital for
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agricultural production requires what Agarwal (2014) terms ‘multipurpose comprehensive
cooperation’. This is much less common, and even less studied.
A study of group farming, based on such multipurpose cooperation, acquires particular
relevance today, given that people in many countries (both developing and developed) are
seeking diverse pathways to carve out viable livelihoods within agriculture. This includes not
only existing farmers looking for more lucrative and sustainable farming options,6 but also
new job seekers who (as noted) have limited non-farm outlets, as well as those who want to
make agriculture a lifestyle choice.7 In this search for alternatives, it would be especially
timely to examine farming models based on cooperation in production.
Here the experience of France is of particular relevance. It has perhaps the oldest and
numerically the most important example of voluntarily constituted and legally enabled
group farms, as embodied in GAECs (Groupements Agricoles d’Exploitation en Commun)
and, to some extent, in EARLs (Exploitations Agricoles a` Responsabilite´ Limite´e). France
can thus provide particular insights on the characteristic features of these group farming
models and the contexts in which they emerge. This is not only because of their long exis-
tence and numerical strength, but also because of their regional clustering: GAECs are
much more concentrated in north-western and central-eastern France, than elsewhere (see
Figures 1 and 2). This begs the question: do regions with more GAECs have features
Figure 1. GAECs number in 2010.
Figure 2. GAECs as a percentage of all farms in 2010.
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especially conducive to cooperation, such as the local economy, ecology, demography, cul-
ture or a mix of these and other factors? An analysis of these factors is of interest both in
itself and to help us understand which underlying factors are more conducive to the for-
mation of group farms. This understanding could also provide lessons for the potential
adaptability of such models beyond France.
The questions we pose have been little researched, especially the factors underlying the
regional clustering of group farms. Our paper thus breaks fresh ground. It will also con-
tribute to ongoing academic and policy debates on economically viable agriculture, by its
focus on farming models based on cooperation. The paper is divided into six sections. The
next section provides a background to GAEC and EARL formation and an overview of
existing studies, following which there is a discussion of the broad characteristics of GAECs
and EARLs based on agricultural censuses from 1988 to 2010. We then present our model
and hypotheses regarding the factors that could explain the greater incidence of group farms
in certain regions over others in 2010. The penultimate section presents our regression
results, followed by concluding reflections and policy pointers in the closing section.
Background and existing studies
Legally, GAECs were catalysed in France by a law passed in 1962, which became fully
effective in 1965 (Raup, 1975). The law specified a legal minimum of 2 partners/associates
and a maximum of 10, with the requirement that all partners work full-time on the farm.
The law also incorporated a ‘transparency principle’ (Article L323-13 of the French Rural
Code) under which the state, for its agricultural support programmes, would treat each
GAEC partner as an individual entity, while recognizing too a GAEC’s collective identity.
This principle enabled GAEC partners to benefit from public incentives on the same basis as
individual farmers, including when the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European
Union (EU) introduced direct income support ‘decoupled’ from price support in 1992.8 Also
in 2013, the EU officially recognized the transparency principle for GAECs.9
Socially, however, GAECs were propelled especially by the Jeunesse Agricole Catholique
(JAC),10 an association of young Catholic farmers, ‘guided by the conviction that a “third
road” was needed between what was regarded as the abuses of capitalism and the excesses of
Marxian collectivism’ (Raup, 1975: 3; see also Boussard, 1991). The farmers, supported by
some intellectuals and high-level civil servants, are said to have convinced the French gov-
ernment that an enabling law was needed. Their efforts fell on fertile ground, since the
government, led by key figures such as Edgard Pisani (Minister of Agriculture, 1961–
1966),11 was seeking to modernize family-based agriculture, and the GAEC was seen as
an institutional innovation close in structure to a family farm, in contrast to a corporate
farm dependent largely on hired employees.
Forming a GAEC was expected to help individual family farms improve their managerial
efficiency, productivity, and work conditions (GAEC & Socie´tie´s, 2010a).12 For instance, by
pooling their resources, even farmers with limited means could modernize their farming
techniques and organization; experiment with new technologies that needed too much cap-
ital for an individual farmer to afford; take advantage of scale economies; and free children
or spouses from agricultural work to seek higher education or non-farm jobs. Moreover, in
recognizing sons and fathers as equal partners, GAECs enhanced the status of sons within
the family, and thus their incentive to work harder and increase productivity. Farmers’
wives, however, remained unequal, both economically and socially (Darque, 2008). Under
the law, married couples could not become associates without the presence of a third asso-
ciate, until a change in law in 2010 allowed spouses to constitute couple GAECs.
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In 1985, another type of group farm – the EARL – was legally instituted, basically as a
limited-liability society, subject to different laws and procedures than GAECs.13 For exam-
ple, unlike GAECs, which required at least two associates, EARLs could also be formed by
one person as well as by married couples. Moreover, in EARLs only shareholders who
individually or as a group hold the majority capital are required to work on the farm,
while minority shareholders need not. GAEC associates, in contrast, cannot take up any
significant income-earning activity outside the GAEC.14 Notwithstanding these differences,
it is important to study EARLs, since those with 2 or more associates (the maximum can be
10) constitute a type of group farm, requiring the associates to make capital investments and
cooperate. In fact, sometimes EARLs change into GAECs or vice versa (GAEC & Socie´te´s,
2010a). Today, many GAECs have sustained for long years (one with six associates is over
50 years old: Copex, 2012), and have moved on to another generation of associates.
These farming models, based on close cooperation among associates (especially in
GAECs), are of considerable contemporary interest for France and other countries.
Apart from the potential advantages of group farming already listed, there are others,
such as the ability of group farms to provide viable livelihoods to those (especially the
young) who lack adequate land or capital to farm alone, or who like a rural life and are
willing to cooperate on a daily basis for the less strenuous work life possible in a GAEC
compared with individual farming. In a GAEC, for example, associates can substitute for
each other in labour-intensive or monotonous tasks and take holiday breaks. Resource
pooling can also allow associates to invest in larger capital-intensive machines, expand
farm size, diversify farm activities or specialize in labour-intensive work such as animal
breeding, and enlarge the range of skills and knowledge beyond those found in one
farmer or one family. The small number of associates who know each other well can also
help overcome the classic problems of free-riding and work shirking through peer-vigilance
and mechanisms for enforcing accountability, such as weekly meetings and manage-
ment committees.
Notwithstanding their relevance, long duration and numerical strength, however, there is
rather little systematic and rigorous research on GAECs. On the quantitative side, although
the French agricultural census provides periodic data on the numbers, locations, composi-
tion and characteristics of GAECs, these data (which are comprehensive from 1988) appear
to have been little-used analytically, beyond the Ministry of Agriculture’s own descriptive
briefs (see various issues of Agreste Primeur and also Agreste, 2014). The studies that do use
the census – such as those investigating farm size inequality across departments (Piet et al.,
2012), or those preparing a typology of farm size and type of labour used (Bignebat et al.,
2015) – fail to separate individual and group farms, thus conflating a crucial characteristic of
French farms. In fact, most existing research on GAECs is qualitative, and even this is
limited in scope. Between 1965 and 1988, for example, the archives of GAEC & Socie´te´s list
29 master’s theses on the subject, but most are sociological studies of single GAECs or
writings on GAEC law. In this period, there was in fact a fascination with the history of
GAEC formation. For instance, a doctoral dissertation by an American anthropologist who
researched 42 GAECs (not selected systematically) spread across France in the mid-1970s
provides historical insights on how GAECs emerged and functioned (Murphy, 1977). There
are also occasional research papers on the administrative, legal and incentive provisions that
encouraged GAEC creation (Raup, 1975), or on how family farms evolved into GAECs
(Bazile and Viallon, 1985; Madec, 1983; Reboul, 1977), as well as some specialized mono-
graphs, such as on the involvement of GAEC associates in the social movements of the
1970s (Alland and Alland, 2002). In fact, this preoccupation with the legal, philosophic,
historical or social aspects of GAECs continues, with empirical exploration being limited to
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a few GAECs, as evidenced by more recent journal articles (e.g. Barthez, 2007; Chandellier
et al., 2012; Foyer et al., 2012), as well as two special issues of Revue de Droit Rural (2012).
These writings are insightful, but they leave many questions unanswered, not only about
the characteristics of France’s group farms and changes in them over time, but particularly
about the geographic variations in their incidence across France. Explaining this variation
through a rigorous empirical analysis, in order to better understand the conditions that
would be conducive to cooperation in production, is the central concern of this paper, and
one which has not been addressed so far in the existing literature.
Characteristics of farm structures and changes over time
To map the range of French farming enterprises over time, we use department-wise data
from the French agricultural censuses of 2010, 2000 and 1988 (Ministry of Agriculture,
2014).15 We complement this with data from other sources, to quantify the explanatory
variables outlined in the next section. Our analysis is confined to 92 of the 96 departments of
metropolitan France: the four excluded departments (Paris, Hauts-de-Seine, Seine-Saint-
Denis and Val-de-Marne) are highly urbanized and have few farms. In this section, we
describe the broad characteristics of France’s group farms and their evolution, before exam-
ining their regional variation in the following sections.
Farm types and shifts over time
In 2010, individual farms, GAECs and EARLs respectively constituted 69.4%, 7.6% and
16.0% of all farms (Table 1). Notably though, almost half of the EARLs had only one
associate, making them effectively similar to individual farms except for their legal status.
Since our interest is in understanding farmer cooperation, we will concentrate on GAECs,
with some comparison with EARLs that have two or more associates (herein
called EARL 2).
In the 22 years between 1988 and 2010, the number of all farm enterprises fell by more
than 50%, mainly due to the dramatic decline in individual farms (Table 1). In contrast,
between 1988 and 2000, GAECs and EARLs increased notably, in both numbers and
proportions, after which EARLs continued to increase numerically, but GAECs showed
a slight decline. Since 2010, however, even GAEC numbers have been rising. According to
GAEC & Socie´te´s, 2296 new GAECs were registered in 2014 alone, many of them being
couple GAECs which were by then legally permitted.16
Table 1. Farms by legal status in 1988, 2000, 2010
Type of farm
1988 2000 2010
No. % No. % No. %
Individual 945,801 93.0 537,444 81.0 339,836 69.4
GAEC 37,708 3.7 41,474 6.3 37,204 7.6
EARL 1523 0.2 55,913 8.4 78,594 16.0
Other 31,393 3.1 28,785 4.3 34,252 7.0
All farms 1,016,425 100.0 663,616 100.0 489,886 100.0
GAEC, Groupement Agricole d’Exploitation en Commun; EARL, Exploitation Agricole a` Responsabilite´ Limite´e.
In this and subsequent tables, all farms (small as well as professional) are included.
Source: Calculated from the 1988, 2000 and 2010 agricultural censuses (Ministry of Agriculture, 2014).
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In proportional terms, the numbers of both GAECs and EARLs rose between 1988 and
2010, with GAECs doubling from 3.7 to 7.6 as a percentage of all farm enterprises.
According to GAEC & Socie´te´s (2010a: 10), there is a strong correlation between the
increase in GAEC numbers and government incentives to encourage young people to
settle in agriculture (DJA or Dotation Jeunes Agriculteurs).17 But other factors, which
cannot be explored here, may also underlie these shifts.
Social composition of group farms
Although the majority of GAECs continue to be constituted only of family members (84%
in 2010), proportionally family GAECs have been declining and non-family or mixed
GAECs have been increasing (Table 2). Among family GAECs, those constituted by
father and son fell from 59% in 1988 to 28% in 2010, while same-generation GAECs –
typically of brothers or cousins – doubled. This suggests that GAECs are moving towards
equality among associates (since father–son GAECs contain an implicit social hierarchy,
notwithstanding their equal legal status as associates).
EARLs, by contrast, were predominantly single-member units (54%) in 2010, 29% being
couple EARLs and only 8% being father–son units, with the rest being variously constituted
(Table 2 and Agreste, 2014: 17). Together, GAECs and EARL 2 comprised 14.9% of all
farms in 2010.
Group farms are also becoming important in terms of annual work units (AWUs) in
agriculture, with 1 AWU being equivalent to one adult working full-time for a year on the
farm (termed ‘Unite´ de Travail Annuel’ or UTA in France).18 In 2010 (the year of the last
French agricultural census), GAECs accounted for 15% of AWUs and EARL 2 for
12.7% of AWUs, together providing 27.7% of total AWUs (Table 3). This is a marked
rise from 8% in 1988, while the figures for individual farms fell from 82.6% to 44.1% during
Table 2. GAEC and EARL by social composition in 1988, 2000 and 2010
Type of GAEC and EARL
1988 2000 2010
No. % No. % No. %
GAEC
1. GAEC mixed 460 1.3 1,596 4.1 2,654 7.4
2. GAEC non-family 1152 3.3 2,655 6.9 3,100 8.7
3. GAEC family 32,891 95.3 34,489 89.0 29,951 83.9
– GAEC father and son (19,283) (58.6) (11,286) (32.7) (8285) (27.7)
– GAEC same generation (7598) (23.1) (15,368) (44.6) (14,799) (49.4)
– GAEC several generations (5965) (18.1) (7602) (22.0) (6434) (21.5)
– GAEC couplea (45) (0.1) (233) (0.7) (433) (1.4)
All GAEC with informationb 34,503 100.0 38,740 100.0 35,705 100.0
EARL
1. EARL single person 789 56.0 31,729 56.7 42,747 54.4
2. EARL 2 associates 619 44.0 24,184 43.3 35,847 45.6
All EARLs with informationc 1408 100.0 55,913 100.0 78,594 100.0
Note: Figures in brackets relate to subcategories of ‘GAEC family’.
aCouple GAECs were not legally permitted till 2010. These numbers could thus reflect either misreporting or farms in
transition which earlier had >2 associates.
bExcludes cases with missing information on GAEC type
cExcludes cases with missing information on associate numbers
Source: Calculated from the 1988, 2000 and 2010 agricultural censuses (Ministry of Agriculture, 2014).
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this period. In 2010, the per-farm AWU (including salaried and seasonal workers) was 3.04
for GAECs, 2.27 for EARLs and 0.98 for individual farms. GAECs (and group farms more
generally) thus provide adult employment which is proportionately greater than their
numeric presence. Also, in 2010, 1 AWU on average managed 48.5 ha in a GAEC, against
42 ha in an EARL and 35 ha in an individual farm (Table 3).
Moreover, if we take average land area, measured here in terms of ‘Surface Agricole
Utile’ (SAU) or utilized agricultural area,19 GAECs are substantially larger in area than
other types of farms and grew faster than them between 1988 and 2010. In 2010, GAECs
managed 147.6 ha on average, relative to 95.2 ha managed by EARLs and only 34.0 by
individual farms (Table 3).20 Notably too, we found that multi-generational family GAECs
and GAECs of both family and non-family associates tended to be the largest, going up to
180 ha on average. A larger number of associates enables farms to diversify their activities
and expand in area, while also making such expansion necessary for an adequate income
per associate.
Activity specialization
Most important for our discussion, group and individual farms differ notably in their prod-
uct specialization. In 2010, almost one-quarter of all farms specialized in seasonal crops
(mostly cereals and oilseeds), 42% in animals, and 21% in horticulture or gardens, planta-
tions and vineyards, with the rest doing mixed farming (Table 4). However, these propor-
tions varied significantly by farm type. Over 65% of GAECs were involved in animal rearing
(with 51% breeding meat and/or milk cattle), and only 10% were producing seasonal crops.
EARL 2 came in between these, with the main activity again being animal farming, prac-
tised by 47%, followed by crops (22%).21
This activity pattern suggests a link between GAEC formation and farm specialization.
Rearing animals tends to be much more labour-intensive than growing crops, since ani-
mals need daily care (feeding, milking, etc.) even with some mechanization. Moreover,
this intensity continues throughout the year and, unlike crops, is not limited to seasonal
peaks. Hence we would expect farmers who want to rear animals to veer towards group
farming. Also, we might surmise that one of the factors underlying the concentration of
GAECs in some regions over others could be ecology, which favours a particular type of
Table 3. Annual work units (AWUs) and average SAU area by farm type in 2010
Type of farm
Farms AWUs
AWUs per
farm
SAU (ha)a
per AWU
SAU (ha)
per farm
No % No % No No No
Individual farm 339,836 69.4 331,179 44.1 0.98 34.8 34.0
Other farms 34,252 7.0 128,381 17.1 3.75 19.0 71.1
GAEC 37,204 7.6 112,963 15.0 3.04 48.5 147.6
EARL 78,594 16.0 178,359 23.8 2.27 42.0 95.2
– EARL 2 (35,847) (7.3) (95,295) (12.7) (2.66) (43.3) (98.4)
All farms 489,886 100.0 750,883 100.0 1.53 35.8 55.0
Note: Figures in brackets are a subcategory of EARL.
aFarm land (SAU) includes both crop land (under seasonal or perennial crops) and permanent pastures.
Source: calculated from the 2010 agricultural censuses (Ministry of Agriculture, 2014).
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specialization. For instance, animal farming is often the best option in many mountain-
ous or semi-mountainous areas (as, say, in parts of central-eastern France), where crop
cultivation tends to be less profitable. Here, difficult work conditions could also encour-
age cooperation.22
Similarly, regions with more permanent pastures would provide fertile ground for form-
ing GAECs, although, technically, intensive livestock breeding is also possible through stall-
feeding. Consider, for instance, Figures 3 and 4. Figure 3, which gives the regional spread of
all farms specializing in animal breeding,23 reveals an interesting overlap between animal
farming regions and the GAEC concentrations noted from Figures 1 and 2: both show
concentrations in western and eastern France. In turn, we would expect animal breeding
to be linked to permanent pastures. Figure 4 gives us permanent pasture land as a percent-
age of SAU. Here, the overlap with GAEC incidence and animal farming is broadly con-
sistent in the eastern parts but not in the western. In western France, as in Bretagne, there is
little pasture land, and here the animals are largely stall-fed, although many still grow fodder
for feed.
We also explored and found an interesting relationship between the regional concentra-
tion of pastures and regional changes in GAEC numbers over time. In Table 1, we had noted
that in absolute numbers GAECs increased considerably between 1988 and 2000, and then
decreased between 2000 and 2010, returning broadly to the 1988 figure by 2010. To see if this
held across departments, we disaggregated these changes further, mapping departments
where GAECs had increased in both periods; decreased in both periods; or had moved
in divergent directions between the two periods. Figure 5 shows a notable similarity to
Table 4. Product specialization by farm type in 2010
Farm specialization (OTEX)
All Farms GAEC EARL 2 associates Individual farms
No. % No. % No. % No. %
Field crops 118,748 24.3 3740 10.1 7846 22.3 82,035 24.3
Cattle 120,526 24.7 18,791 51.0 11,113 31.6 77,806 23.0
– Meat (59,519) (49.4) (4150) (22.1) (2374) (21.4) (48,404) (62.2)
– Milk (50,219) (41.7) (11,653) (62.0) (7594) (68.3) (24,056) (30.9)
– Mixed (10,788) (9.0) (2988) (15.9) (1145) (10.3) (5346) (6.9)
Sheep and/or goats 56,216 11.5 2549 6.9 1699 4.8 47,974 14.2
Pigs, cattle (stall-fed)
and/or chicken
29,881 6.1 2721 7.4 3723 10.6 15,931 4.7
Mixed farms 59,579 12.2 6782 18.4 5185 14.8 39,837 11.8
Horticulture or plantation 32,865 6.7 862 2.3 1432 4.1 23,934 7.1
Viticulture 69,872 14.3 1424 3.9 4122 11.7 50,347 14.9
All farms with
OTEX information
487,687 100.0 36,869 100.0 35,120 100.0 337,864 100.0
Unlabelled farms 1,770 – 0 – 0 – 1536 –
No information on OTEX 429 – 335 – 727 – 436 –
All farms 489,886 37,204 35,847 339,836
Percentages exclude farms which were unlabelled or had missing information on specialization.
Figures in brackets are subcategories of cattle breeding.
Source: calculated from the 2010 agricultural census (Ministry of Agriculture, 2014).
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Figure 3. Farms specializing in animal breeding as a percentage of all farms in 2010.
Figure 4. Permanent pastures as a percentage of SAU land in 2010.
Figure 5. Changes in absolute numbers of GAECs: 1988–2010.
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Figure 4: the departments where GAECs have increased in absolute numbers consistently
since 1988 overlap in fair extent with departments that have high proportions of permanent
pastures, and vice versa.
In addition, Appendix Table 1 shows that the GAECs specializing in animal breeding are
the ones that have increased in absolute numbers between both periods (with the exception
of stall-fed breeding), while the GAECs specializing in crops and horticulture/plantations
have decreased in numbers in both periods, suggesting a particular link between GAEC
formation and pasture-dependent animal farming. This relationship between the regional
incidence of GAECs and the regional concentration of permanent pastures (and hence
animal farming) is further borne out by our regression results.
One additional point needs to be mentioned here, which is difficult to capture statistically
but is likely to have a bearing on changes in GAEC incidence over time, namely a snow-
balling effect. We would expect that in regions where GAECs have been historically suc-
cessful, a demonstration effect would lead more farmers to see GAECs as alternatives to
individual farms and form one themselves. Also, over time, such regions would stimulate
investment in support services such as for refrigeration, milk processing and storage, animal
slaughter and marketing, which newcomers forming GAECs could take advantage of.
Similarly, farmers who have been exposed directly to GAECs formed by their parents or
relatives or neighbours are more likely to form or join GAECs themselves than are those
totally unexposed to such enterprises. All these factors could intensify a regional clustering
of GAECs over time. We get some support for this phenomenon in the observed strength-
ening over time of regional clusters around animal breeding, for which the support services
mentioned above are likely to prove much more important than for crop cultivation. In
other words, a snowballing effect could vary across activities. This could be one among
other factors underlying the changes in group farm numbers between 1988 and 2010, but
exploring these factors further is beyond the scope of this paper.
Explaining regional variability: hypotheses
We draw on our conceptual and historical understanding of French farming to identify
potential explanatory factors for the observed regional variability of GAECs and EARL 2
in 2010. Some factors could be economic, others ecological, social/cultural or demographic.
We use an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model (specified below) to test for the
significance of the identified factors. The dependent variable Y is the percentage of GAECs
(or EARL 2) to total farm enterprises in a department:
Yd ¼ b0 þ
X
i
biXi;d þ
X
j
kjRdummyj þ ed
where d represents departments (there are 92), Xi denotes the explanatory variables (detailed
below and in Appendix Table 2), {b0, bi} are the parameters to be estimated, and R repre-
sents the 13 regions we have controlled for.
The explanatory variables are the following:
• economic (percentage of farms with SAU <20 ha, 20–49 ha and 50 ha respectively in
1970; and income Gini index in 2010);
• ecological (percentage SAU under permanent pasture in 2010, and percentage SAU irri-
gable in 2007);
• social (number of active priests c.2010–2014); and
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• demographic (percentage of students specialized in agriculture in 2010; and percentage of
women among farm workers in 2010).
Below we outline our hypotheses relating to these variables, first for GAECs and then
briefly for EARL 2.
Economic factors
We examine two economic variables to explain the regional (departmental) incidence of
GAECs: (1) farm size categories dominant in the department in 1970 (that is, fairly soon
after the GAEC law became effective); and (2) income inequality as measured by the
Gini index.24
In relation to pre-existing farm size categories in a department, normally we would expect
the presence of a large number of small farms to encourage group farming, since resource
pooling would help non-viable farms to create a viable economic unit. This trajectory may
not play out for GAECs, however, since GAEC associates are legally required not only to
pool their resources (each has to bring a share of capital or land), but also to work full-time
on the farm without seeking outside employment, or running individual farms on the side.
This means that the GAEC must provide associates with at least a basic income. Moreover,
the idea that all farms (not just GAECs) should be large enough to yield a minimum income
for the family was embedded in the French government’s 1975 decree, under its Rural Code
(article 188), which specified the minimum surface area (Surface Minimum d’Installation
(SMI)) for settling in agriculture.25 These factors are likely to reduce the chances of very
small farms combining to form GAECs. Rather, we would expect departments with a high
percentage of small farms in 1970 (the earliest year for which there are data after the GAEC
law became effective) to be less likely to have formed GAECs.
Departments with a high percentage of very large farms in 1970 would also be less likely
to form GAECs, since they would not need to do so to tap economies of scale, although they
may form one for other reasons, such as engaging in multiple economic activities. In short,
departments with a high percentage of farms in the very small and very large categories in
the early period of GAEC formation may be expected to have lower proportions of GAECs
today. It also means that the relationship between farm size categories and GAEC incidence
is likely to be non-linear. In this context, Raup’s (1975: 21) observations for the 1970s are
especially notable: he observed that GAECs tended to be concentrated in areas dominated
by medium-sized farms, and were rarer in areas dominated by either very large or very small
farms. He did not, however, statistically test this observation, as we will be doing.
To test the effect of a pre-existing farm size distribution on GAEC formation, we used
data from the 1970 agricultural census. Although it does not give the size of each farm, it
gives us the proportion of farms in different farm size categories (in SAU units) in the
department. Our hypothesis is that the higher the proportion of farms in a department in
1970, in either the <20 ha category or the 50 ha category, the lower is likely to be the
proportion of GAECs to total farms in 2010 in that department. In contrast, the higher the
proportion of farms in the 20–49 ha category in 1970, the higher is likely to be the propor-
tion of GAECs to total farms in 2010.
With regard to our second economic variable, we would expect GAECs to thrive more in
regions of relative economic equality, since GAEC formation is likely to need the prevalence
of a spirit of cooperation. Indeed, equality among associates is an important principle in
GAEC formation and functioning. Also, group homogeneity is often noted to be more
conducive to cooperation than heterogeneity (Baland and Platteau, 1996). Hence regions
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with high inequality could adversely affect GAEC formation. We measure inequality by
using the Gini index (Gini coefficient 100) of the department’s per household tax-
able income.
Ecological factors
We would expect local ecology to play an important intermediary role in GAEC formation.
As noted earlier, some regions of France are less suited to crops, such as ecological zones
with poor land quality, marginal pasture areas and mountain terrain characterized by low
crop yields, leaving animal breeding on pastures as the main livelihood option. In addition,
the CAP has regulations restricting the conversion of permanent pastures to crop land.26
For example, the CAP reform of 2003 linked the maintenance/use of permanent pastures to
subsidies, which would be reduced if the pastures were converted to cropland (see e.g.
Beaufoy et al., 2011). Moreover, the reform specified that land under permanent pasture
in a given reference year be maintained. In France, the reference year was 2003 and the
regulation was enforced from 2005 (Desjeux et al., 2007: 19).27 In many regions, therefore,
ecological and related conditions encourage milk or meat farming over crops or other
activity. Livestock breeding, in turn, needs high labour inputs throughout the year, which
would encourage GAEC formation, since GAECs can induct more adults to share the work.
There would therefore be a greater likelihood of GAEC formation in regions with more
permanent pastures (and hence greater potential for livestock farming). We use the percent-
age of SAU land under permanent meadows and pastures in a department as an explanatory
variable, expecting it to be related positively to the incidence of GAECs in the department.
A region’s irrigation potential can also affect activity choices. Crop cultivation is more
dependent on irrigation than other farm activities, and one crop – maize – alone accounts
for half of all surface area irrigated in France (Barraque´ et al., 2010). Farmers in regions
with a higher percentage of irrigable land are thus more likely to cultivate crops, and hence
less likely to form GAECs. We use irrigable area as a percentage of total SAU to test this
effect. Notably, only 9.8% of SAU land in France was irrigable in 2007 and only 5.8% was
actually irrigated around that time.28
Social factors
The importance of social norms and relations of trust and reciprocity in laying ground
conditions conducive to cooperation is now widely recognized in collective action theory.
In the early years of GAEC formation, catholic priests and religious associations, especially
the JAC, played an important role in establishing social norms that emphasized community,
cooperation and benefit sharing (Murphy, 1977). Rene´ Colson, a French farmer, became the
general secretary of JAC in the early 1940s and mooted the idea of small farmers pooling
resources to invest in machinery, and practice modern agriculture through cooperation.29 In
1951, he founded an organization with his colleagues, which evolved into GAEC & Socie´te´s
40 years later (GAEC & Socie´tie´s, 2012: 5).
Catholic priests worked with JAC to encourage young farmers to form GAECs (Murphy,
1977; Raup, 1975). To capture these social effects on GAEC formation, we used the number
of active (non-retired) Catholic priests in a department in the early 2010s as a proxy measure
to explain the regional incidence of GAECs. In today’s France, of course, religion is a less
cohesive force, and other types of institutions – political bodies, farmers’ unions, and similar
associations – can generate social capital, cohesion and support. But we lack data to
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empirically measure the impact of these diverse institutions, which may also pull in differ-
ent directions.
Demographic factors
We would expect at least two demographic factors to affect the geographic incidence of
GAECs: availability of educated youths specialized in agriculture and the gender composition
of the agricultural workforce. The first is likely to matter especially due to the link between
having an agricultural degree and getting state support. For instance, formal training in agri-
culture at the secondary level or above has been essential (at least since the early 1990s: Rogers,
1991: 150) for getting the young farmer subsidy (DJA) that is offered by the French govern-
ment and the EU (see also endnote 17). Although the DJA is not linked to any type of farm
(group or individual), a young farmer could use it more effectively by becoming a partner in a
GAEC than by setting up an individual farm on his/her own, since this could require additional
investments. The importance of formal training is strengthened further by the necessity (bar-
ring exceptional circumstances) for farming establishments to have professional agricultural
skills in order to receive national and European incentives.30 A degree can also help farmers
acquire the skills to manage bigger farms, which need more complex accounting procedures.
Moreover, without an agricultural qualification, farmers face greater restrictions on buying or
renting farm land.31 Overcoming such restrictions matters more to GAECs, since they have a
greater need than individual farms to expand farm size in order to provide for all the associates.
Overall, therefore, in regions where a larger percentage of students are specializing in agricul-
ture, the potential for constituting GAECs is likely to be greater.
The gender composition of the agricultural workforce is also likely to matter, given the
noted legal restriction until 2010 on wives becoming GAEC associates with husbands, unless
there was a third associate. This restriction was much debated over the years. Some argued
(unsuccessfully) that excluding spouses was neither pragmatic nor conducive to the efficient
organization of a farm (e.g. Foyer et al., 2012). Others felt that the restriction would free
wives from hard agricultural labour and allow family holidays, which would prove difficult
if both spouses worked on the same farm. In 2010, this restriction was legally removed
(GAEC & Socie´te´s, 2010b), but since we are using 2010 data it is too early to catch the
impact of this change. For our analysis, we expect that the larger the percentage of female
farm workers in a department, the lower would be the proportion of GAECs.
What about EARL 2? We may expect the effects to be similar to GAECs on some counts
but different on others. In terms of divergence, first, since not all EARL associates work on
the farm, EARLs are less likely to be affected by the labour intensity of an activity (in
particular cattle versus crop farming), and therefore by whether a department is dominated
by permanent pasture or crop land. In fact, EARLs may even favour crops since they need less
labour than animal upkeep (in other words, the relationship could even be negative). Second,
related to crops, we would expect the availability of irrigable land to be positively related to
the incidence of EARLs. Third, since EARL 2 could be formed by couples even before 2010,
and given that associate wives are not required to work in an EARL, we do not expect the
percentage of women working in agriculture to notably affect the incidence of EARL 2.
Regression results
In our regressions, we examine the impact of the above-mentioned explanatory variables on
the two dependent variables at the department level: (1) the percentage of GAECs out of
total farm enterprises; and (2) the percentage of EARL 2 farms out of total farm
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enterprises. The analysis is based on 2010 data, unless another year is mentioned.
Exact definitions of the explanatory variables are given in Appendix Table 2. All equations
are adjusted for regional fixed effects based on the administrative classification of France
into 13 regions in the early 2010s. The regression results are presented in Table 5 and the
summary statistics in Appendix Table 3.
First consider the results for GAECs (Table 5, equation 1). Of the two economic varia-
bles, the outcomes for farm size are particularly interesting. We find that the higher the
proportion of 20–49 ha farms and the lower the proportion of 50 ha farms in 1970, the
greater the share of GAECs to all farms in 2010. Departments with a 1 percentage point
higher proportion of 20–40 ha farms (relative to <20 ha farms) in 1970 have a 0.15 percent-
age point higher share of GAECs in 2010. In contrast, departments with a 1 percentage
point higher proportion of 50 ha farms (relative to <20 ha farms) in 1970 have a 0.11
percentage point lower share of GAEC farms in 2010. In other words, the regional incidence
of GAECs in 2010 rises with an increase in the proportion of 20–49 ha farms but falls with
an increase in the proportion of 50 farms in 1970, while departments dominated by <20 ha
farms come in between. In short, it is in departments with a predominance of farms which
were neither too small nor too big in 1970 that we find the highest proportions of GAECs
four decades later (as was observed for an earlier period by Raup, 1975); and the relation-
ship between farm size and GAEC formation is non-linear.32
Our second economic variable, the Gini index of household taxable income, is again
consistently and negatively significant, as hypothesized. Departments with higher levels of
income inequality have a significantly lower proportion of GAECs relative to all farms. On
average, departments with a one point higher Gini index have a 0.4 percentage point lower
proportion of GAECs.
Table 5. Geographic variations in the incidence of GAECs and EARLs: regression results
Dependent variables: percentage of total
farms in 2010
GAECs EARL 2
Explanatory variables equation 1 equation 2
Percentage of farms with SAU 20–49 ha, 1970 0.154*** (0.000) 0.054* (0.063)
Percentage of farms with SAU 50 ha, 1970 0.106*** (0.001) 0.058* (0.069)
Income Gini index, 2010 (from 0 to 100) 0.398** (0.042) 0.074 (0.637)
Percentage SAU under permanent pastures, 2010 0.077*** (0.000) 0.030*** (0.009)
Percentage SAU 2010 that was irrigable in 2007 0.047 (0.119) 0.041** (0.028)
No. active priests, c.2010–2014 0.008* (0.055) 0.003 (0.291)
Percentage of students specialized in agriculture, 2010 0.346** (0.023) 0.116 (0.234)
Percentage of women among farm workers, 2010 0.916*** (0.000) 0.061 (0.483)
Controlled for 13 regions Yes Yes
Constant 43.747*** 6.87
N 92 92
Adjusted R2 0.82 0.81
SAU, Surface Agricole Utile (utilized agricultural area).
All regression equations are with robust standard errors and adjusted for regional fixed effects.
Figures in parentheses are p values. Significance: *** at 1%; ** at 5%; * at 10%
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Of the two ecological variables, however, although the signs of the coefficients for both
variables are in the directions hypothesized, only the pasture variable is significant: the
higher the percentage of permanent pasture to total farm land in the department, the greater
the proportion of GAECs to other farms, while irrigable area is negative but insignificant.
Our regression results for pastures thus support and supplement the observations in the
previous section.
The social variable is again significant. The greater the number of active priests in a
department, the greater the percentage of GAECs to other farms, although the coefficient
is small. The demographic variables have an important impact, however. Departments with
a higher proportion of students specializing in agriculture have a significantly higher per-
centage of GAECs, and those with proportionately more female farm workers have a sig-
nificantly lower percentage of GAECs. A 1 percentage point rise in the proportion of
students in agriculture raises the share of GAEC farms by 0.35 percentage points, while a
1 percentage point rise in the proportion of women among farm workers lowers the share of
GAEC farms by almost 1 percentage point (equation 1). Overall, our model explains 82% of
the regional variations in GAEC proportions.
Now consider the EARL 2 results (Table 5, equation 2). Here we see interesting differ-
ences with GAECs. To begin with, the effect of farm size distribution in 1970 on the incidence
of EARL 2 in 2010 is (as with GAECs) positively significant for the 20–49 ha category, but
unlike GAECs it remains positively significant even for the 50ha category. Departments
with a 1 percentage point higher proportion of 20–49 ha or 50ha farms in 1970 (relative to
<20ha farms) have a 0.05 percentage point higher share of EARL 2 in 2010. The difference
between the coefficients of the 20–49ha size group and the 50 size group is also significant.
In other words, it is departments dominated earlier by medium to large-sized farms that have
the higher shares of EARL 2 in 2010, while a dominance of <20ha farms in a department in
1970 was a deterrent to EARL 2 formation.33 It is likely that the differences between
EARL 2 and GAECs in the farm size results arise because EARLs from the start could
be managed as large corporate entities with a few associates, whereas with GAECs large farms
required several associates, especially with labour-intensive animal production, and this could
make coordination more difficult. In recent years, however, mechanization has moved apace
even in milk farming, with the introduction of robots for milking, and GAECs engaged in
animal breeding too can grow to quite large sizes.
The results for GAECs and EARL 2 also differ on other counts. For instance, for
EARL 2 although the Gini index is negative, it is not statistically significant, nor is the
number of active priests. The percentage of SAU under pasture is negatively significant for
EARL 2 (while for GAECs it was positively significant), and the percentage of SAU irrigated
is positively significant for EARL 2, whereas it was negative and insignificant for GAECs.
These results are in keeping with our earlier observations that EARL 2 farms are more likely
to undertake crop cultivation than GAECs, while animal farming (linked with pastures), with
its high labour intensity, is less likely to be favoured by EARL 2 farms, understandably since
(unlike GAECs) they cannot depend on the guaranteed labour of associates.
In addition, for EARL 2 (in contrast to GAECs), the impact is insignificant for both
proportion of students in agriculture and proportion of females among farm workers. That
gender is not significant is not surprising, since unlike GAECs (as noted earlier) married
couples could form EARLs even before 2010. Across all the variables, the coefficients of the
explanatory variables for the EARL 2 equations are also much smaller than for the GAEC
equations. However, our model explains 81% of the regional variations for EARL 2.
Overall, therefore, the departments that tend to have a larger percentage of GAECs are
those that were dominated by middle-sized farms historically (rather than very small or large
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farms); whose ecological conditions are more favourable to animal farming (especially the
percentage of land under permanent pastures); whose economic and social conditions are
conducive to cooperation (less economic inequality and a greater presence of institutions
that promote community cooperation); and which have particular demographic character-
istics (a greater presence of students in agriculture and a lower presence of women among
farm workers). For EARL 2, economic inequality matters less, and although farm size
distribution is important, the effect is different from GAECs at the higher ranges. Also,
while the ecological variables are significant, it is in the direction opposite to that for
GAECs, and the demographic variables are insignificant. On gender, given the change in
GAEC laws, the difference between GAECs and EARL 2 farms is likely to disappear
in time.
Concluding reflections and policy pointers
What lessons can we draw from this analysis for France, and for regions beyond France?
For France, our analysis suggests, first, that group farming will tend to find more fertile
ground in regions that have less overall economic inequality, a larger percentage of farms
historically in the lower to middle size range (rather than very small or very big) and more
social institutions that promote community cohesion/cooperation.
Second, cooperative ventures are more likely to be sought for those agricultural activities
that require intensive labour inputs on an everyday basis, such as cattle breeding (for milk or
meat). Hence group farms are more likely to emerge (or take root more easily if promoted)
in ecological zones that have a high incidence of permanent pastures, or where other types of
farming are less profitable or less possible, as in harsher mountain areas and in zones with
poor-quality land. The reverse is likely in regions that have favourable conditions for crop
cultivation due to, say, soil type or access to irrigation. Since crops require less intensive
labour inputs on a regular basis than animal breeding, they can also be managed effectively
by individual families (or associations like EARLs, which have few working associates),
with peak requirements being covered by hired labour and machines. Here there would be
less incentive to undertake group farming.
Third, demographic factors matter, such as the incidence of agricultural graduates or of
women farm workers in a region, but these factors can also be subject to legal conditions (as
in France), such as whether an agricultural degree is needed to access farm subsidies, or
whether spouses alone can form an association.
The incidence of farm enterprises needing lower levels of cooperation than a GAEC, such
as EARL 2, are likely to be affected by somewhat different factors. Economic inequality
and social and demographic factors appear not to matter in the same way, but ecological
variables such as pastures and irrigation do matter, depending on the choice of farm spe-
cialization and hence intensive labour needs.
These observations stem from our results based on existing models of group farming.
Variations on these models may emerge, however, if some of the legal requirements for
forming GAECs were relaxed. For instance, GAEC associates need to work full-time on the
farm and pool all their productive resources. This requirement implicitly dictates a certain
minimum farm size. If associates were allowed to undertake supplementary income-earning
activities at an individual level, such as managing their own farms in addition to the group
farm, or allowed to seek part-time non-farm work, then even small farms could pool their
resources and farm collectively, while also pursuing other earning opportunities. Of course,
in such models it would be especially important to set in place mechanisms for monitoring
Agarwal and Dorin 17
each associate’s work contribution, in order to ensure that the work is equitably shared and
the likelihood of free-riding is minimized.
Beyond France, say for other parts of the EU, the factors found significant in our study –
especially economic and ecological – are general enough to be relevant. Also, EU laws (such
as those pertaining to permanent pastures or subsidies for young farmers) which have
played an enabling role for group farming in France would be applicable to other countries
in the Union.
For developing countries, however, it is more difficult to extrapolate directly from our
results, since their laws governing land use and tenancy and the structure of subsidies tends
to be quite different. Even so, it could be argued that efforts to promote group farming are
more likely to be received favourably in regions of lower economic inequality, and where the
local ecology and economy favour labour-intensive farm activity, such as animal breeding.
Many of the other advantages of group farming mentioned earlier, such as labour sharing,
viable farm size, resource pooling for capital-intensive investments and skill diversification
would apply as well. The GAEC model also points to a potential pathway for women
farmers and junior family members in the Global South to move away from simply being
unpaid workers on family farms, since it allows spouses, siblings and adult children to
become equal business partners in a group farm. At the same time, models that allow a
combination of group farming and individual activity (rather than those which only allow
group activity) are likely to be more relevant for developing countries, where most farmers
cultivate very small farms of a hectare or less, and therefore need to diversify their livelihood
portfolios to earn a decent income.
Finally, looking ahead, group farming can provide an important third model of farming,
beyond family farms and corporate agriculture, not only for farmers who are seeking better
economic and ecological outcomes, but also for newcomers interested in community-based
options, agroecological practices and building social and solidarity economies around food
and farming systems. GAECs emerged in France as a result of young farmers seeking a third
path, away from the negative features of both capitalist and socialist farming, and a gov-
ernment seeking to modernize agriculture within the ambit of families and communities.
These motivations are as relevant today, and not just in one country or region but increas-
ingly more globally.
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Notes
1. Land area is only one measure of farm size, but it is the most commonly used. In France, by the
2010 agricultural census, 24.5% of all farms were less than 5 ha in size.
2. See Sabates-Wheeler (2002) and Sabates-Wheeler and Childress (2004) for Romania and
Kyrgyzstan respectively; Mathijs and Swinnen (2001) for East Germany; Ruben and Lerman
(2005) for Nicaragua; and Agarwal (2010a) for additional examples.
3. See, especially, Robinson (1967) and Nove (1969) for the USSR; Lin (1990) and Putterman (1997)
for China; and Goyal (1966) and Agarwal (2010a) for an overview of several countries.
4. See, especially, Agarwal (2010a) for a detailed discussion on both socialist collectivization and the
1950s/1960s experiments in cooperative farming in developing countries.
5. See, e.g., Deininger (1993), Mascarenhas (1988), Haris and Fulton (1999), and Fisher and Qaim (2014).
6. The globally expanding agroecology movement is a case in point (Wezel et al., 2009).
7. For example, there is a growing trend towards community-supported agriculture in Europe and
the USA (see, e.g. Adam, 2006), including examples of community members farming jointly on
small plots (personal observation in Brussels by Bina Agarwal in 2018). Enrolment in agricultural
courses is also growing in the UK and elsewhere (Guardian 2016).
8. In 1992, the EU under the CAP began to reduce price support for particular products, while
introducing ‘direct payments’ per farm (or per associate in the case of GAECs).
9. In terms of recognition, for direct subsidies see EU Regulation No. 1307/2013 of 17 December
2013, articles 8.4, 11.5, 41.8 and 52.7. For the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development
(EAFRD), see EU Regulation No. 1305/2013 of 17 December 2013, article 31.4. For debates
around this in early 2013, see Saget (2014).
10. The JAC, created in 1929 by youths and priests, became the Rural Christian Youth Movement
(MRJC) in 1963, and constituted a vibrant wing of the French Catholic Action.
11. In 1960, another key institution which impinged on farm structures and growth was introduced,
namely Socie´te´s d’Ame´nagement Foncier et d’Etablissement Rural (SAFER). These non-profit pri-
vate companies work under government supervision, with a pre-emptive oversight on all trans-
actions in agricultural land (Boinon, 2003).
12. GAEC & Socie´te´s is the national association of GAECs founded by several organizations, includ-
ing FNSEA, the main farmer’s union in France. It publishes the journal Agriculture de Groupe.
13. Other French farm enterprises, such as civil companies (SCEA) or commercial companies (SARL),
are few in number (Agreste, 2014: 3).
14. See https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/initRechCodeArticle.do and therein “Code rural et de la peˆche
maritime” articles L323-1–L323-16 and R323-1–R323-54. (accessed 20 September 2018).
15. Some details (especially on the social composition of GAECs) are not available in censuses prior
to 1988.
16. Personal communication, Eric Mastorchio (GAEC and Socie´te´s, Paris), March 2016. In the
absence of census data after 2010, these figures are strongly indicative.
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17. In France, subsidies were established in 1973 for young farmers under 35 years of age, initially for
mountainous and less favoured areas, but extended in 1976 to all of France, the amounts varying by
the farm’s location (Boinon, 2003: 168). Subsequently, other types of aid were added (including start-
up aid and business development grants), and the age limit raised to 40 (European Commission,
2013). In 2014, additional conditions were set (Agreste, 2014; GAEC & Socie´te´s, 2016).
18. See the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies, France: https://www.insee.fr/fr/
metadonnees/definition/c1039 (accessed 20 September 2018).
19. SAU includes arable land (that is land under crops, vegetables, fallows, temporary pastures, and
perennial crops such as vines and orchards) and permanent pastures, but excludes woods and forests.
20. France distinguishes between ‘small’ farms and ‘professional’ farms (namely ‘medium’ and ‘big’
farms) based on their annual standard gross production or ‘SGP’ (www.insee.fr/en/metadonnees/
definition/c1354, accessed 20 September 2018). We based our analysis, however, on all farms, in
order to test which farm size categories were more likely to form GAECs. Also, for international
comparability, we used agricultural area rather than SGP to define farm size.
21. See also Agreste (2014) for a discussion on activity specialization and farm type.
22. Within the broad category of ‘mountain areas’ there can of course be exceptions, but typically
mountain areas tend to be less suitable for crops than flat areas or valleys, in terms of soil, climate,
potential for irrigation, mechanization and market connectivity. The government also recognizes
these disadvantages in the special incentives it gives for mountain areas.
23. Animal breeding includes farms breeding cattle for milk and/or meat (grazed or stall-fed), sheep,
goats, pigs and poultry.
24. We also tried another economic variable, namely percentage population that was jobless in the
department in 2008 or earlier, to see if unemployment in the past affects GAEC percentages in
2010, but the coefficients were not significant in most equations. Also, the data aggregate unem-
ployment across the department and do not separate rural joblessness. It is also difficult to antic-
ipate how much the time lag may be. Hence we have not included this variable in our results.
25. Fixed by ministerial decree (and periodically revised), the SMI varied by departments and zones
within departments, according to land quality and activity. However, we could not find historical
SMI data for all departments that we could use as the threshold level. SMI specifications were
discontinued in 2014. See http://www.terresdeurope.net/SMI.asp (accessed on 20 September 2018).
26. Under French rules, permanent pastures are ‘areas devoted to grass production or other herba-
ceous fodder crops, in place for 5 years or more (except fallow lands). These permanent pastures
are [so] named whether [they are] permanent grasslands, temporary grassland more than 5 years
old, moorland, heath and rangelands’ (Beaufoy et al., 2011: 31).
27. See also European Union (2009), wherein Regulation (EC) No. 1782/2003 recognized the envi-
ronmental benefits of permanent pastures and sought to encourage their maintenance and prevent
their mass conversion to cultivated land. This principle still stands (see Regulation No. 1307/2013
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013).
28. See the Ministry of Agriculture at http://www.stats.environnement.developpement-durable.gouv.
fr/Eider, accessed 10 February 2015.
29. See also Flauraud (2006) on JAC and Hervieu and Purseigle (2008) on the influence of Christian
youth movements on young farmers in France, historically.
30. http://www.terresdeurope.net/en/acquiring-capacity-french-professional-agricultural-skill-qualifi
cations.asp (accessed on 20 September 2018).
31. See articles L331-1–L331-12 and R331-1–R331-12 of the French Rural Code.
32. We also tested the impact of average farm size and farm size square in 1970 on GAEC incidence in
2010: both were significant but with opposite signs (the former positive, the latter negative), again
indicating a non-linear effect.
33. This is also supported by an additional regression we ran with only the <20 ha farm size category
in equation 2. The coefficient was significant and negative (–0.056).
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Appendix Table 1. GAECs by farm specialization, 1988–2010
Farm specialization
GAEC (numbers) Annual rate of change over given period
1988 2000 2010 2000–1988 2010–2000 2010–1988
Cattle, sheep or goats 14,671 17,844 18,791 1.6% 0.5% 1.1%
Stall-fed animals 3694 3857 2721 0.4% –3.4% –1.4%
Field crops 5940 5097 3740 –1.3% –3.0% –2.1%
Horticulture or plantation 985 718 454 –2.6% –4.5% –3.5%
Viticulture 2098 2329 1424 0.9% –4.8% –1.7%
Mixed farms 7826 8446 6782 0.6% –2.2% –0.6%
Total farms with information
on specialization
37,333 41,153 36,869 0.8% –1.1% –0.1%
All farms 37,708 41,474 37,204 0.8% –1.1% –0.1%
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Appendix Table 2. Definitions and data sources for explanatory variables.
Variable Definition
Surface Agricole Utile (SAU) This is ‘utilized agricultural area’ which includes arable land, per-
manent grassland, permanent crops, other agricultural land such
as kitchen gardens. It excludes unused agricultural land, wood-
land and land under buildings, farmyards, tracks, ponds, etc.a
Percentage SAU under permanent
pasture, 2010
Percentage SAU under permanent pastures, census 2010a
Percentage SAU 2010 that was
irrigable in 2007
Percentage SAU in 2010 that is irrigable using the latest available
2007 data on irrigable area. For the 20 departments that had no
data on irrigable area in 2007, the 2000 value was used.b
Average SAU per farm, 1970 Average SAU per farm (ha), 1970c
Percentage farms with SAU <20 ha,
20–49 ha, and 50 ha in 1970
Percentage farms under 20 ha SAU, 20–49 ha SAU, and 50 ha
SAU (as relevant) in 1970c
Gini index, 2010 Gini index of taxable income per unit of household consumption
in 2010d
No. of active priests, c.2010–2014 Number of priests per department currently active (i.e. not yet
retired), c.2010–2014. Data are only available by diocese.
Adjustments were made when these did not overlap with
administrative departments.e
Percentage of students specialized in
agriculture, 2010
Percentage of students in secondary education (or doing short-
term higher education degrees) who specialize in agriculture,
September–October 2010f
Percentage of women among farm
workers, 2010
Percentage of agricultural workers (other than seasonal workers)
who are female in 2010. These include farm heads, co-heads and
agricultural salaried employees.a
Sources of data: aMinistry of Agriculture (2014); bMinistry of Agriculture (http://www.stats.environnement.developpe
ment-durable.gouv.fr/Eider, accessed 10 February 2015); c‘Donne´es en ligne Agreste’ (http://agreste.agriculture.gouv.fr,
accessed 14 April 2016); dInstitut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques (http://www.insee.fr, accessed
19 January 2015); eEglise Catholique de France (http://www.eglise.catholique.fr, accessed 20 January 2015); fMinistry of
Agriculture (http://www.chlorofil.fr, accessed 19 January 2015) and Ministry of Education (http://www.education.gouv.fr,
accessed 19 January 2015).
Appendix Table 3. Summary statistics.
N Mean SD Min. Max.
GAEC 92 7.73 4.63 0.74 20.48
EARL 2 92 7.12 3.41 0.90 15.97
Percentage of farms with SAU <20 ha, 1970 92 65.70 16.92 31.07 98.08
Percentage of farms with SAU 20–49 ha, 1970 92 23.68 9.86 1.20 52.28
Percentage of farms with SAU 50 ha, 1970 92 10.61 10.83 0.44 43.85
Income Gini index, 2010 92 33.95 2.02 30.27 39.58
Percentage SAU under permanent pasture, 2010 92 32.83 24.23 1.40 94.44
Percentage SAU 2010 irrigable, 2007 92 10.81 12.27 0.03 54.01
No. active priests, c.2010–2014 92 98.50 67.50 24.00 358.00
Percentage of students specialized in agriculture, 2010 92 4.71 2.69 0.13 11.65
Percentage of women among farm workers, 2010 92 31.26 2.46 23.58 37.00
Note: N, number of observations; SD, standard deviation.
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